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1

The Vienna Circle and the Consolidation of Scientific 
Superiority over Metaphysics

Nyuykongi John Paul (Ph.D)
Department of Philosophy, 

University of Bamenda, Cameroon.

Abstract
This paper unravels the Vienna Circle's attempt to adjudicate the question of veritable 
knowledge in favour of a Western-backed approach as a demonstration of a form of 
epistemic continence. It looks towards a Meta-Epistemic consolidation that will ensure 
unity between metaphysics and epistemology (science) without valorizing any. The 
suggestions and arguments in this work hinge on three posits: First, the advent of Modern 
Empiricism on the one hand, and the development Objectivist Epistemology on the other 
hand, played significant roles in shaping the ideas of the Vienna Circle. It further argues 
that the Circle took for granted that knowledge founded only on empirical evidence may 
sound attractive, yet remains partial. Last, the paper asserts that the consolidation of 
scientific superiority rather acts as a fetter against the production and dissemination of 
holistic knowledge constructs. Consequently, considering the complex nature of the 
scientific practice, the work suggests the need to reintegrate other approaches to 
knowledge in research, as well as reconstruct knowledge systems to accommodate 
diversity. In this regard, contrary to some claims, when knowledge pursuit proceeds by 
the elimination of meta-theories as well as other forms of knowledge, it runs the risk of 
falling into a reductionist conception of knowledge. 

Keywords: Epistemology, Logical positivism, Metaphysics, Scientific knowledge, 
Vienna Circle

Introduction
The quest to establish the affinity between science and metaphysics constitutes one of the 
major philosophical enquiries in the history of thought. The relationship between the two 
is viewed differently by different pundits across the history of ideas. This paper sets out to 
restate the question regarding the preeminence of science over metaphysics. It unravels 
the Vienna Circle's attempt to adjudicate the question of veritable knowledge in favour of 
a Western-backed approach as a demonstration of a form of epistemic continence. It looks 
towards a Meta-Epistemic consolidation that will ensure unity between metaphysics and 
epistemology (science). Thinkers such as Roger Bacon, Francis Bacon, John Locke and 
David Hume are emphatic on scientific superiority over metaphysics, whereas, Rene 
Descartes, Leibniz and Carol Rovane think that metaphysics forms the basis of scientific 
knowledge. Members of the Vienna Circle thus sought to construct a Philosophy of 
Science that will abrogate this age-old problem. To them, the elimination of metaphysics 
from science was indispensable. It is important to state that this approach to epistemic 
research negates hitherto medieval and Cartesian claims according to which knowledge 
hinges on divine sources and as a tree whose base is metaphysics, the trunk physics and 

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the branches being other sciences respectively (Descartes, 1644: 6). The Vienna Circle 
thcomprised of a group of 20 -century philosophers whose preoccupation was the 

reconceptualization and investigation of scientific, logical, linguistic and mathematical 
problems. Founded in Vienna by Moritz Schlick, who, himself was inspired by Bertrand 
Russell's defence of empiricism based on the new logic (Wittgenstein, 2003: XVIII). 
Other members include Rodulf Carnap, Hahn Hans, Frank Phillip, A.J. Ayer and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein. With the ambition to make philosophy scientific and establishing a 
scientific conception of the world, these scholars sought to eliminate knowledge 
constructs whose scientific basis could not be proven. In this light, “all metaphysics 
should be replaced by the new discipline of epistemology or theory of knowledge so that 
philosophy itself would now become scientific” (Creath, 2012: 1). Richard Creath 
concurs when he argues that, “the fundamental problem, which that time placed at the 
beginning of all science, was that of the theory of knowledge: what is truth in our intuition 
and thought? In what sense do our representations correspond to actuality? Philosophy 
and natural science encounter this problem from two opposing sides; it is a common task 
of both (p.2).

The term Science has its origin in the Greek word episteme and from the Latin 
Scientia which means knowledge. Science is a method of discovering reliable knowledge 
of nature (Schafersman, 1997). From the conceptual and reflective perspective, science 
could be seen as a body of knowledge that is acquired through rigorous and demonstrated 
approaches given attaining a universal value. Metaphysics, on the other hand, is a 
derivative of meta and phusika, translated as "beyond" and "nature" respectively. It is that 
branch of philosophy which focuses on the essence of being. That is a reality beyond the 
scope of nature. To Aristotle, it is the study of the foundation of essences, of the new 
foundation of knowledge (Rene Descartes), of the foundation of criticism (Immanuel 
Kant) and the foundation of meanings (Phenomenologists). According to Carol Rovane, 
“Metaphysics” is any inquiry into the most general aspects of what there is, or how things 
are, or the nature of the things that are” (Rovane, 2013: 4). Metaphysics consists in the 
systematic study of the most fundamental logical and modal properties of things (1987: 
77). With this understanding, this paper argues that, the Vienna Circle's attempt to 
adjudicate the question of veritable knowledge in favour of Western-backed approach 
suggests a form of epistemic continence. The suggestions and arguments in this work 
hinge on three hypotheses: First, the advent of Modern Empiricism and the development 
Objectivist Epistemology played significant roles in shaping the ideas of the Circle. 
Second, the Circle took for granted that knowledge founded only on empirical evidence 
may sound attractive, yet remains partial. Finally, that the consolidation of scientific 
superiority rather acts as a fetter against the production and dissemination of holistic 
knowledge constructs. In consonance with the aforementioned hypotheses, one is driven 
to reiterate a Meta-epistemic approach to pluralistic knowledge.

 Modern Empiricism and the Rise of Scientific Knowledge
          The historical context of the emergence of the Vienna Circle could be traced right 
back to modern Empiricism. Modern empiricists like Francis Bacon, Roger Bacon, 
Locke and Hume played an antecedent role in the emergence of the Vienna Circle in the 

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twentieth century.  The common objective is to develop a science void of dogmatism, by 
proposing more authentic and logically sound approaches to scientific knowledge. 
Recurrent amongst the approaches are experimentation, verification and observation. 
Bacon, a major proponent of modern Empiricism is noted for his defence of observable 
approaches to knowledge. To him, it is impossible to access reality behind the sensations 
with which one is impressed (H. Irving. 2008: 6). Roger Bacon on his part hints that: 
“observation and experience constitute the door to knowledge and the criterion of truth” 
(Stella, 2008: 61). Here, a paradigmatic shift from the traditional approach to knowledge 
of the ancient and medieval thinkers is highlighted. This traditional approach gave 
credence to metaphysics as the foundation of knowledge. To Bacon, genuine knowledge 
is based on the collection of facts or sense data. Here, two distinct steps are involved: the 
collection of facts and involving the classification of facts collected, thereby deducing 
from the new data. These two steps depend on observations and experimentations which 
are the model of the new and successful mode for the advancement of learning (H. Irving. 
2008: 7). With this approach, Bacon singles out himself as an advocate of the Aristotelian 
legacy of empiricism. Experience to him, is the source of human knowledge, with 
induction as the only acceptable method of acquiring reliable and practical knowledge. 
He posits:

Now my method, though hard to practice, is easy to explain; and it is this. I propose to 

establish progressive stages of certainty. The evidence of the sense helped and guarded by a 

certain process of correction, I retain. But the mental operation which follows the act of sense 

I, for the most part, reject; and instead of it I open and lay out a new and certain path for the 

mind to proceed in, starting directly from the simple sensuous perception (p. 10).

This Baconian position developed an empirical scientific system characterized by 
Observation, experimentation, and Explanation. Inspired by this approach, Carnap 
contends regarding the scientific procedure:

The activities of a scientist are in part practical given that he arranges experiments and makes 

observations. Another aspect is theoretical because he formulates the results of his 

observations in sentences, compares the results with those of other observers, tries to explain 

them by a theory, and endeavors to confirm a theory proposed by himself or somebody else 

(Carnap, 1939: 1).

        Apart from Bacon, Locke is another pertinent modern empiricist whose thought the 
Vienna Circle is predicated. His epistemology as an antithesis to the Rationalists' doctrine 
of innatism asserts that innate ideas rather act as fetters to knowledge acquisition. He thus 
emphasized the indispensable role of observation and experience in the process of 
knowledge acquisition (Locke, 1828: 51). All ideas to him, therefore, come from 
experience which could either be the experience of sensation or reflection (p. 51). In this 
phrase, Locke expresses his conception of the mind as a tabula rasa. The original state of 
the mind at birth, to Locke, is void of preexisting ideas. This is a claim that A.J. Ayer 
ratifies when he asserts that, “the view of philosophy which we have adopted may, I think, 
fairly be described as a form of empiricism it is characteristic of an empiricist to eschew 
metaphysics, on the ground that every factual proposition must refer to sense-experience” 
(Ayer, 1935: 37). Locke's stance concerning experience, ties to Bertrand Russell 

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according to whom “in the search for certainty, it is natural, to begin with, our present 
experiences, and in some sense; no doubt, knowledge is to be derived from them” 
(Russell, 1912: 4). Concurring with Russell, Berkeley states that:

It is evident to anyone who takes a Survey of the Objects of Human Knowledge, that they are 

either Ideas actually imprinted on the Senses. By Sight I have the Ideas of Light and Colors 

with their several Degrees and Variations. By Touch I perceive, for example, Hard and Soft, 

Heat and Cold, Motion and Resistance, and of all these more and less either as to Quantity or 

Degree. Smelling furnishes me with Odors; the Palate with Tastes and Hearing conveys 

Sounds to the Mind in all their variety of Tone and Composition (Berkeley, 2002:12).

This conception of experience as the only reliable foundation of scientific knowledge 
developed by modern empiricist thinkers like Roger Bacon, Francis Bacon, Locke, Hume 
and Berkeley, became a prelude to the foundation of the Vienna Circle. 

The Influence of Objectivist Epistemology and German Idealism on the Vienna 
Circle

  The controversy between German Idealism from Immanuel Kant to Hegel and the 
objectivist epistemology of Bernard Bolzano is noted to have revolved around the 
question of reliable human knowledge (Stadler, 2001: XV). Earlier objectivist 
epistemologists, on the one hand, claimed that knowledge or reality is attained 
independent of the human mind. Idealists on the other hand opine that thoughts are the 
fundamental reality. Kant, faithful to the idealist culture, is emphatic that: though all our 
knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of 
experience. It is, therefore, a question which requires close investigation, and not to be 
answered at first sight, whether there exists knowledge altogether independent of 
experience, and even of all sensuous impressions (Kant, 2003: 30). He emphasizes on the 
existence of  Apriori and a posteriori forms of knowledge regarded as a form of 
epistemological metaphysics.

In the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Kant inquires into the apriori forms of 
sensation, judgment, and reasoning. Even though considered by Locke as knowledge, 
Kant sets out to distinguish between the material, or content, and the form, of sensation. 
The material of sense-knowledge comes from experience. The form, however, is not 
derived through the senses, rather, it is imposed on the material, or content by the mind, to 
render the material or content universal and necessary. Of far more importance than all 
that has been above said, is the consideration that certain of our cognitions rise completely 
above the sphere of all possible experience. These cognitions employ conceptions whose 
corresponding objects cannot be captured by our experience. (p. 30). He grounded his 
theory of knowledge in the following lines: thoughts without content are empty, and 
intuitions without concepts are blind (Stern, 2015: 55), suggesting that knowledge is the 
combination of thought and intuitions. By emphasizing the distinction between the 
necessary knowledge that is a priori and experiential knowledge that is contingent and a 
posteriori, Kant's critical philosophy attempts to demonstrate the nature and limits of 
human knowledge. Further, he considers the reconciliation of the two opposing 
tendencies on the origin of knowledge which involves reason and experience. This 

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distinction, he maintains, is further understood as the one which exists between analytical 
and synthetic judgments. 

Bernard Bolzano for his part thinks that knowledge can be attained through experience 
and speculation (Bolzano, 1950). It is in this vein that  Christoph Limbeck Lilienau will 
affirm: “many philosophical traditions have been mentioned as predecessors of logical 
empiricism that led to the emergence of the Vienna Circle, from Ernst Mach's empiricism 
and Bertrand Russell's new logic to Neo-Kantianism and Austrian philosophy in the 
tradition of Bolzano and Brentano” (Lilieneau, 2019).  Bolzano emphasizes the view that 
knowledge is acquired through recollection and experiences. For these reasons, the 
author denounces the distinction between knowledge and cognition. Members of the 
Vienna Circle taken aback by this approach to knowledge construction will work towards 
the elimination of metaphysics from the field of objective knowledge. 

The Vienna Circle and the Preeminence of Science as Opposed to Metaphysics 
Discussions and deliberations of the Vienna circle centered around the questions 

of scientific knowledge and metaphysics. They sought to establish the superiority of 
scientific knowledge over Metaphysics. As Russell puts it, to better understand a 
philosophical theory, it is necessary to attempt an appreciation of its force of argument 
(Russell, 1912: VII). It thus becomes incumbent on one to analyze and reexamine the 
hitherto claims of scientific supremacy over meta-theories. We thus, opt to do this taking 
in to account their defense of experience and/ or perception as the foundation of human 
knowledge void of any Metaphysical consideration.

The mission of the Vienna Circle was to develop an epistemology of exact 
sciences based on facts and empirical evidence. Moritz Schlick noted that the Circle 
ascribed a particular value to science and a special and distinct epistemological status to 
scientific knowledge since science is the search for knowledge par excellence. As such, to 
them, scientific knowledge is the only real knowledge. What validates this claim, to him 
is that the progress science makes. This attempt to demonstrate the superiority of 

th
scientific knowledge is not akin only to the 20  century. It dates as far as the modern 
period. This is evoked by Nyuykongi 2020:

It is not uncommon to have philosophers of science drum the virtues of modern science, sing 

its glories and claim that there is no other source of knowledge that is capable of satisfying 

man's quest for certitude other than Science. These claims, they say, are corroborated by the 

fact that modern science is capable of attaining objective truth while others are not. Here, the 

rational nature of science is emphasized as a virtue over the irrational nature of nonscientific 

sources of knowledge (Nyuykongi, 2020: 470).

Prior to this, Schlick had announced that there is no other way of understanding the world 
but a scientific one (Schlick, 1979: 132). Reasoning from the position of the Vienna 
Participants such as Carnap, the scientific conception of the world is familiar only with 
empirical statements about things of all kinds and analytic statements of logic and 
mathematics (Carnap, 1973: 298). The Viennese saw metaphysics as the worst enemy of 
science and the only way to understand the world is by science. To them, Metaphysics is 
not a valid form of knowledge since it deals with the supernatural, barren of any solid 

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terrestrial foundation. The verification principle became the yardstick used to determine 
whether or not, a knowledge construct is scientific as opposed to metaphysics. To know, 
following Ayer, is to have experience with something that could empirically be verified 
(Ayer, 1956: 2-3). This was antithetical to the Cartesians for whom; “I Think” is the 
precursor to knowledge acquisition. Otto Neurath, for instance, is known for his anti-
foundational approach to epistemic and metaphysical questions, specifically, his 
rejection of aprioristic reasoning. He denounces mysticisms, metaphysics as well as 
theological beliefs which to him, are epistemic traps. To buttress this, Jan Sebestik 
emphasized Neurath's epistemology in his physicalism. To him:

Physicalism is the positive side of a doctrine whose negative side is expressed by the slogan 

elimination of metaphysics. Two major reasons guided the Viennese in their opposition to 

metaphysics: its historical and social role and the absence of cognitive content. In the first 

place, Neurath fights metaphysics under the banner of Enlightenment. Heir of theology, and 

metaphysics was on the side of obscurantist and oppressive forces. Cognitive reasons are 

equally compelling. The parallel and complementary doctrines of Wittgenstein, Schlick, 

Carnap, Neurath, and Hahn, but also of the poet Paul Valéry coincide in this point: 

metaphysical statements are meaningless; they are but pseudo-statements, sequences of 

words that do not designate anything and do not mean anything. It is impossible to connect 

them with an object, an observation, a phenomenon or an act. They can have an emotional 

and perhaps a poetical effect, but no cognitive value (Sebestik, 2011: 41).

          The author substituted an apriori form of reasoning for an aposteriori one. This 
substitution had one main objective; the elimination of metaphysical claims of 
knowledge and its introspective methods. The knowledge that conforms to scientific 
methods of observation, experimentation and verification, thus, was bound to undergo 
purification from metaphysical and religious dogmas in conjunction with their 
meaningless statements. Some of such statements, they claim, are the doctrine of innate 
ideas defended by Plato in ancient times and Descartes in the modern era (Jumbam and 
Kernyuy, 2022: 495-507).
          According to A.J. Ayer, for example, the quest for objective knowledge must not 
accommodate the rationalists' and idealists' approaches. This suggests the barren nature 
of meta-scientific approaches to knowledge. Real scientific knowledge, to him, should 
not go beyond the limits of sense experience. Therefore, any knowledge construct which 
attempts to go beyond the limits of possible sense experience, became fruitless and 
sterile. Every knowledge or statement of knowledge must be gotten in conformity with 
the criterion of verifiability. Vienna Circle philosophers generally argued on the falsity of 
the doctrine of metaphysics because it opposes empirical knowledge and is thus 
unverifiable.
      Considering empirical evidence and logically sound arguments as the only basis 
towards the acquisition of genuine knowledge, members of the Vienna Circle developed 
an anti-metaphysical attitude which could be summarised in four essential points as 
follows: (1) a distinct epistemological status; (2) conceptual and Linguistic clarity; (3) 
accorded value to scientific knowledge attained through empirical evidence and logical 
sound statements; and (4) the notion of inter-subjectivity and the quest for genuine 
knowledge. Their distinct epistemological status is emphasized by their zeal to 

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demonstrate the supremacy of science thereby paving the way for a deeper appreciation 
of scientific knowledge as opposed to other forms of knowledge. One major characteristic 
of science employed as a challenge to other sources of knowledge is that science, with its 
unique approach, produces a result and its alternatives do not. These results, the scientists 
claim, are tagged to its method and its universality.
         Second, the Circle focused on the notion of conceptual and linguistic clarity. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein for instance, credits the sound nature of logical statements on the 
logically perfect language. He hereby separates the epistemological problem of language 
from the psychological problem of knowledge. He further signals a challenge to know, 
what the nature of the relation subsisting between thoughts, words or sentences, and that 
which they refer to or mean is: this problem, to him, belongs to epistemology 
(Wittgenstein, 2015: 4-5). He thinks that a reliable theory of scientific knowledge solely 
depends on the logical structure of propositions and their language meanings. This 
symbolic language helps us to separate the theory of knowledge from mystical, 
theological and metaphysical biases. It is the logically perfect language that prevents us 
from falling into the nonsensical statements of metaphysics. Finally, it is important to 
note that the Circle thus, accorded utmost value to scientific knowledge attained through 
empirical evidence and logically sound statements against the notion of inter-subjectivity 
and the quest for genuine knowledge. This notion of inter-subjectivity, it must be 
mentioned, goes beyond the pure subjectivist epistemology of Descartes. 

The Way Forward: Towards a Meta-Epistemic Approach to Pluralistic Knowledge
In this sub part, one argues that the Circle's consolidation of the superiority of 

epistemology over metaphysics leads inevitably to a reductionist conception of 
knowledge. One concurs with Kant who suggests that knowledge results from the fusion 
of thought and intuitions. Kant emphasized the distinction between a priori and a 
posteriori forms of knowledge. He further attempted to reconcile the two opposing 
tendencies on the origin of knowledge vis, reason and experience. This distinction is 
understood as the one which exists between analytical and synthetic judgments. Bernard 
Bolzano on his part thinks that knowledge can be attained through experience and 
speculation (Bolzano, 1950). On the other hand, the Circle's bias towards the superiority 
of the sciences and the elimination of metaphysical voices is a barrier to growth and 
research in science and epistemology. In fact:

When epistemology is defined as an inquiry, it suggests that epistemology is an inquiry 

into the possibility, scope and limits of knowledge. This presupposes that knowledge 

claims are shrouded with possibilities and impossibilities, a characteristic feature which 

calls for complementarity of approaches, not competition … current epistemologies are 

fundamentally biased and this trend is detrimental to global epistemic … From thence, 

one argues further that there is the possibility of a bias-free epistemology, which is 

achievable when strides are made towards complementing epistemic approaches rather 

than raising competing voices (Nyuykongi, 2020: 14).

The suggestion here is that, epistemology should not claim complete autonomy from nor 
claim superiority over neighboring notions like metaphysics, beliefs and opinions. This 
position equally agrees with Feyerabend, especially on the need to take into account 

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existing alternative approaches to knowledge acquisition. To Feyerabend, for instance, 
scientific autocracy should be substituted by methodological pluralism. This, to him, will 
ensure progress in knowledge acquisition. He criticised the implementation of fixed rules 
in scientific practice by noting as follows:

You can be a good empiricist only if you are prepared to work with many alternative theories rather 

than with a single point of view and experience. This plurality of theories must not be regarded as a 

preliminary stage of knowledge which will in the future be replaced by the One True Theory. 

Theoretical pluralism is assumed to be an essential feature of all knowledge that claims to be 

objective. Such a plurality allows for a much sharper criticism of accepted ideas than does the 

comparison with a domain of facts which are supposed to sit there independently of theoretical 

considerations (p. 8).

 Methodological anarchism, to Feyerabend, is a precondition of progress in 
science, that “there is only one principle that can be defended under all circumstances and 
in all stages of human development. It is the principle anything goes.” (Bruce, 1994: 83). 
To buttress his point, Feyerabend argues elsewhere that:

A scientist who wishes to maximize the empirical content of the view he holds and who wants to 

understand them as clearly as he possibly can therefore introduces other views; that is, he must 

adopt a pluralistic methodology. He must compare ideas with other ideas rather than with 

'experience' and he must try to improve rather than discard the views that have failed in the 

competition (Feyerabend, 1993: 21).

This defence of plurality of approaches in the quest for epistemic certitude only 
goes a long way to strengthen the argument that the rejection of metaphysics rather acts as 
a fetter to epistemic growth. Growth in knowledge is predicated on the complementarity 
of approaches with the positivist approach.   Epistemic bias in favour of science backed 
theories and against non-scientific theories obstructs growth in knowledge. This is 
because, on a closer look, one notices some sort of mutuality between the alternative 
approaches to knowledge. For this reason, Feyerabend's defence of methodological 
anarchism as a precondition to scientific progress set out to liberate science research from 
falling in to the pit of dogmatism, especially the dogmatism of the rationalists and the 
empiricists. To attain objective knowledge, there is the need to ensure that one principle is 
defended under all circumstances and in all stages of human development. Feyerabend 
adumbrated this claim in Science in a Free Society, 1978. Elsewhere, Feyerabend, in 
defense of pluralistic approach to science research, speaks of the limitations inherent in 
all methodologies, scientific methodologies inclusive. He maintains:

All methodologies have their limits; the development of science combines reason and practice (he 

ultimately labels this interactionist view, in which methodology serves as a guide who is part of the 

activity guided and is changed by it); rationalism is only one tradition among many, so should not 

be used to judge other traditions; a plurality of traditions is not only reasonable, it is useful, and it is 

correct (Bruce, 1994: 84-85).

The prestige attributed to science is once more punctured in this paper when the author 
interrogates; what is great about science. A careful examination of scientific activities 
reveals a squalid picture of irrationality and trial and error and not rationality, objectivity 
and operational status. Robert Mackie concurs when he reiterates that:

Central to Feyerabend's concern has been the divorce between theories of scientific activity and the 

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actual practices of science. Attempts by philosophers of science to account for the growth of 

knowledge have been seriously flawed by what he sees as the limits of rationality and the desire to 

make Great Science conform to Great Standards. Indeed, Feyerabend has a derisively scornful 

attitude towards the efforts of philosophers of science, apart from himself of course. Bastard 

subjects such as the philosophy of science, which have not a single discovery to their credit, profit 

from the boom of the sciences and should be allowed to die a natural death (Mackie, 1983: 48).

The much-cherished principle of Anything Goes was at the centre of his liberalism. He 
gave credence to what rationalist will term untenable theories. This, through what he 
called anarchism. However, he insisted that epistemology should become anarchic, or 
that philosophy of science should become anarchic.to him, both disciplines should 
receive anarchism as medicine. This is because, epistemology is sick, and it must be 
cured. The best medication being anarchy (Feyerabend, 1978: 127).

Without playing the advocate for epistemological anarchism a la Feyerabend, I 
suggest the urgent need for research in science to go beyond the scientific optimism of the 
Vienna Circle, the need tailor our research toward a more inclusive metaphysical 
perspective. It is worth stating here that, the traditional role of metaphysics was to provide 
a synthesis for the different specialisms within knowledge, it is not then outdated. This 
role still suffices. As if to concur, Aleksandr Kulieshov's argument is pertinent. To him, 
any knowledge or understanding of reality is found within the horizon of a certain world 
picture (Kulieshov, 2017). That is why a metaphysical perspective is inevitable for any 
cognitive activity of human beings. Such a perspective can have rational, irrational or 
supra-rational representations. Rational representation is known under the name of 
metaphysics as a branch of theoretical knowledge. The two main sources of this 
knowledge are experience and speculative thinking (or Apriori reasoning). The latter is 
also derived from experience but undergoes a crucial break up with it using abstraction. 
Empirical knowledge and to a great extent speculative knowledge are represented within 
the sphere of theoretical cognition by natural and social sciences. Epistemology or the 
theory of knowledge is essentially connected with Metaphysics. The implication of this 
conclusion thus puts to question the position held by the Vienna thinkers.

Conclusion
The major concern in this paper was to examine the pertinence of the Vienna Circle's 
quest for the consolidation of scientific superiority over other forms of knowledge such as 
Metaphysics and Theology. In an attempt to resolve this preoccupation, we began by 
tracing the general context of the emergence of their thoughts. The historical context of 
the emergence of the Vienna Circle could be traced right back to Modern Empiricism, 
Comtean Positivism, Logical Positivism or Empiricism, German Idealism and 
Objectivist Epistemology. These schools of thought greatly influenced the founding of 
the Vienna Circle. A global and strict analysis of the thoughts of the Vienna circle 
conceptions of the scientific supremacy over meta-theories through their defence of 
experience and/ or perception as the foundation of human knowledge independent of the 
metaphysical foundation has also been considered. The Vienna Circle philosophers who 
were mostly scientists, physicists, mathematicians and logicians, established a distinct 
epistemological status based on the model of exact sciences. To achieve this, they laid 

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emphasis on the supremacy of science. Such an approach to knowledge pushed many 
thinkers to carry out a deeper appreciation of scientific knowledge as opposed to other 
forms of knowledge whose approach parallels that of the exact science. This work equally 
problematized the pertinence of their thoughts, highlighting, as a matter of necessity, the 
pertinence of a pluralist approach to knowledge pursuits. In fact, sustaining scientific 
superiority over Meta-theories, the Vienna Circle introduced a fetter against the 
production and dissemination of holistic knowledge constructs. In this vein, this paper 
thus reiterates the need for a Meta-epistemic approach to pluralistic knowledge. Here, it 
suggests the integration of diverse approaches to knowledge which spans beyond the 
scientific optimism of the Vienna Circle and her reductionist drive to knowledge. This is 
because, epistemic advancement and progress in science is not better archived by the 
rejection of alternative voices and theories. Rather, growth in knowledge is directly 
proportional to one's capacity to accommodate and complement the other. 

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                                            Aquino Journal of Philosophy, Vol 2 Issue 2 2022-December
ISSN: 2786-9792

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